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Abstract
This paper discusses the post-acquisition restructuring in post-socialist economies. As
case evidence from East Germany illustrates, foreign investors not only have to provide
crucial resources and integrate firms into global production networks. They also have to
become involved in the process of organizational change in the enterprise itself. This
change is often inhibited by compatibility problems and discrepancies between the new
strategic management and the local organizational culture which evolved under socialism.
To facilitate an evolutionary process of organizational integration, management may
emphasize the transfer of specific skills which requires the communication of tacit
managerial and organizational knowledge.
The paper brings together the perspectives of a business economist and a sociologist.
Keywords: Enterprise Restructuring, Post-Acquisition Management, Organizational
Change, Systemic Change, Eastern Germany.
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21. Introduction
Many foreign investors in the countries of the former Soviet bloc found the task of
converting acquired firms into competitive units of their multinational operations more
cumbersome than they expected. The costs incurred in restructuring and integrating
formerly state-owned firms frequently exceeded the costs of the original acquisition.
In this paper, we analyse this process with an evolutionary economics perspective.2 The
enterprise transformation requires quantum leaps forward in several dimensions, including
ownership structures, corporate strategy, operational management and corporate culture.
However, firms as organizations follow an evolutionary path of development. Some key
variables may be changed by a shock-therapy, for instance the ownership or strategic
objectives. Foreign investors can overcome major barriers to strategic restructuring by
providing crucial resources and integration into an international network. Yet an
organization as a social organism adapts only gradually to external changes. The basic
routines and attitudes of groups and individuals have a high degree of persistence and
adjust to changes in the environment in often unpredicted ways. Therefore, the
superimposition of new institutions may lead to frictions between the agents of change
and the previously existing organization.
This research is based on three cases studies of Danish investors in Eastern Germany
- with quite distinct experiences. Rockwool, a world leading manufacturer of stone wool,
acquired via its German affiliate a producer of isolation materials in Eastern Germany.
They succeeded to upgrade the production line to a capable supplier within the investors
network. Danisco, a food processing conglomerate, took over eight sugar refineries. They
invested in technological upgrading, accelerating technological progress, but changing
little in the basic rationale of production. Managers experienced unexpected obstacles but,
seen in perspective, the integration went smoothly and can be judged as a success.
                                         
2  See Nelson (1995) for a review of evolutionary economics. Evolutionary analysis has been
applied to the East European transition e.g. by Murrell (1992), Kogut (1996) and Swaan (1997).
2MEAT A/S,3 on the other hand, intended to move a meat processing plant from Fordist
production based on economies of scale and standardized products to modern production
management with high diversification and flexibility. This required deep changes in the
organizational structure and in the corporate culture. In attempting to take several steps
of organizational evolution simultaneously, the investor encountered tremendous
obstacles.
The paper is laid out as follows: in section two, we review the experience of enterprise
transformation in Eastern Germany using the concepts applied for analysis in other
transition economies, and reflect on the impact of politics on the enterprise
transformation. We argue that the shock-character of change inhibited an evolutionary
process of institutional development.
In section three we present the cases of Danish investors. In section four we interpret
the findings of the case studies, identifying several influences slowing the process of
strategic restructuring. The main underlying cause is, in our view, that the adaptation of
routines and attitudes in local business units did not evolve along with strategic changes
at corporate level. The existing national and organisational cultures conflict with the new
strategies and work organisation introduced by foreign investors.
We conclude with section five which points out implications of the evolutionary
perspective on the management of change in countries in economic transition. Although
East German transition may be very different in a macroeconomic perspective, many of
the managerial challenges are very similar across Eastern Europe and the former Soviet
Union.
2. East German Enterprise Transformation in Perspective
                                         
3 >Meat A/S= is used to protect the anonymity of our case firm.
The tasks of enterprise restructuring in transition economies are summarized in figure 1.
The first step of enterprise transformation was passive: the central plan system broke
down. Some observers, e.g. Abel and Bonin (1993), thus speak of >plan d sertion= rather
than market reform. This step was formalized by giving enterprises their own economic
3identity through formation of limited liability companies, in the German case AG=s and
GmbH=s. This commercialization thus created economic agents, and managers found
themselves with the responsibility for a wide range of decisions entirely different from
anything experienced under the previous regime. Initially, newly established privatization
agencies, in Germany the Treuhand-Anstalt, held all the shares, but did generally not
interfere in the day-to-day operations of the firms.
Figure 1: Strategic Transformation
Socialist Firm ==> Competitive Private Enterprise
Production unit in the central planCommercializationEconomic agents
State owned Privatization Private owned
Low productivity Competitive productivity
Inputs and production volume are
  determined by the plan
Defensive adjustment,
downsizing
Adjustment of production volumes
  and inputs to demand and costs
Plan bargaining Strategic management
Products at the end of their life
  cycle
Strategic
Restructuring
Products at early stages of their life
  cycle
Passive financial transactions Financial management and accounting
Plan fulfilment Marketing
Vertical and horizontal integration New boundaries of the firm
source: based on Meyer 1997
In terms of formal changes, privatization is the second step. Through privatization,
ownership of the firm is transferred to one or many private owners, who are expected to
take control over the firm and to instruct management to steer the firm through the rough
waters of competition. As new owners would normally be profit oriented, they would
create incentives for management to act in a profit-oriented way.
4Across Eastern Europe, the formal changes occurred following lengthy political
processes of establishing the legal framework and often equally complex negotiations over
the arrangements for each individual enterprise. During this time, enterprises had to start
their restructuring process. As ample empirical evidence shows (reviewed by Brada 1996,
and World Bank 1996), enterprises did start restructuring ahead of privatization, though
primarily in a passive or defensive way. Managers made short-term adjustment to output
and input levels to increase productivity. They changed production volume, employment
and capacity to reflect market demand, and reduced operating costs and exposure to bad
debt. Studies also find evidence of entry in new domestic and foreign markets, though
mainly for existing rather than new products. Only occasional evidence suggests that
managers took advantage of the weak governance structures at the time by diverting assets
from state-firms to their private interests.
However, strategic restructuring emerged only very slowly, and indeed rarely without
cooperation with a foreign partner.4 Yet only strategic restructuring positions the
enterprise in the competitive environment for the medium or long-term. It requires the
development of marketing and finance as functions in the company, and the introduction
of new products that are in demand on the market. Often strategic restructuring also
required the sale of operations because of the high degree of vertical and horizontal
integration that was efficient under a state-planning regime, but is not in a market
economy. The strategic restructuring is inhibited by four gaps faced by transition firms
(Meyer 1997):
C The access to financial resources is inhibited by an underdeveloped financial sector and
the high risk of investing in an uncertain environment.
C Weak systems of corporate governance often lead to ineffective control of owners over
management, or conflicting interests of insider-owners (Frydman et al. 1996).
C The success criteria for management and entrepreneurship in a market economy differ
                                         
4 The evidence on enterprise restructuring and performance has been recorded and analysed by
e.g. Estrin et al. (1995), Mygind (1997), Pohl et al. (1997), Smith et al. (1997), Basu et al. (1997).
5fundamentally from the leadership skills, experience and vision that evolved under
socialism.
C Relationships with customers and suppliers have been interrupted, and new contacts
to international production networks have not yet been established.
If firms are sold to foreign investors in the course of the privatisation, the western firm
takes over the control of the firm. Western investors control crucial assets that can
facilitate successful transformation, bridging the aforementioned four gaps (figure 2).
The formal changes of commercialization and privatization, and the defensive and
strategic restructuring evolved gradually in most transition economies, with no clear
pattern of sequencing. Indeed, even privatization did not induce strategic restructuring in
many firms, especially if they were transferred to insider control or if ownership was
6widely dispersed (Brada 1996). In contrast, a clear sequencing could be observed in
Eastern Germany:
(1) Commercialization ==> (2) Defensive Restructuring
 (3) Privatization ==>  (4) Strategic Restructuring.
In 1990, the Treuhand-Anstalt was created as a holding company for all industrial
enterprises as in the still independent German Democratic Republic. By law, its objectives
were defined as the privatisation of the enterprises and the recreation of competitiveness
for the firms under its control. Following German unification, the agency concentrated on
privatization of firms through auctions and, for large firms, on individual negotiations
with potential investors. Voucher schemes, which were common in most other East
European countries, have never been seriously discussed for Germany. Before to
privatisation, companies were dis-integrated to reduce the extend of vertical and
horizontal integration. In some cases, such as the sugar case below, several small firms
were sold together as one unit. The individual approach to privatisation enabled the
Treuhand to set specific conditions for each privatisation project, including employment
and investment guarantees. Most firms were sold to West German companies in the same
industry, who thus were able to expand their operations to the East (Geppert and Kachel
1995). Less than 10% of firms were sold to foreign investors.
Prior to privatization, the Treuhand made resources available if they were needed for
adjustments in the firms. Yet, with few exceptions, the Treuhand permitted only
investments that were >inv stor neutral=, that is investment should not favour one potential
acquirer over another (Müller 1993, Geppert and Kachel 1995). This however excludes,
by definition, any strategic investment as described above. The policy was motivated by
the desire not to throw good money after bad at a time when there was not effective
mechanism of corporate governance that would insure effective allocation of the funds.
Evaluating individual investment projects proposed by its 10,544 affiliate firms is simply
beyond the managerial capability of any state-holding company (Müller 1993). Delegating
restructuring to the managers would have resulted in complex principal-agent 
relationships which, because of continued soft budget constraints, were unlikely to create
7suitable incentives for managers (Brückner 1997).
While the >privatization-before-restructuring= approach appears sensible from a
corporate governance perspective, it implied that East German firms were disabled from
strategic investments during the time of most radical changes in their markets. During
these crucial months and years they were unable to take strategic decisions that would
stimulate a positive evolutionary process of organizational change. In fact, there was
enormous strategic investment in eastern Germany at the time: by West German and
foreign businesses dividing the markets, almost, amongst themselves. Few independent
East German firms were able to develop marketing assets, such as brand names, though
some retained brand names proved valuable later. Only after privatization and under new
ownership, firms initiated strategic restructuring and (re-)entry to competition, now as
affiliates of the western firms.
Since the initial barriers could rarely be overcome without a western partner, the
process of change was very much directed by outside >change agents=, rather than through
self-reflection, learning and adaptation of the organization itself. Sociologists thus speak
of an externally determined transformation in East Germany which explains some of the
frustration often felt in Eastern Germany, but not in neighbouring countries (Wiesenthal
1996). Thus enterprise transformation generally did not build on an evolutionary process
within the organization, but started with a forced break with the institutions of the past
which were perceived as a liability by the new owners (as well as many new local
leaders). Our three case firms illustrate dimensions of this process.
3. The Cases
The case studies provide insights into technological modernization induced by foreign
investors, and the subsequent learning processes and organizational restructuring in the
acquired firms.5 All three cases analyse Danish investors who entered in 1991, in
competition with other West European companies.
                                         
5 See Bjerg Møller [1996] for details of the case research.
83.1. Rockwool International A/S: Technological Upgrading in a Stone Wool Company.
The Danish Rockwool Group is the world=s la gest manufacturer of stone wool, with
around 6000 employees worldwide and an annual turnover of more than US$ 800 million.
Stone wool is the basic material used by the group for a variety of applications, most
importantly thermal insulation and fire protection (82% of turnover). The company is
active worldwide, but focuses on the markets of the European Union where Germany is
the largest single market.
In recent years the group has seen a strong expansion into Eastern Europe, where the
acquisition in Flechtingen, East Germany has been its first stepping stone in 1991. The
strategic objective was primarily to enter the rapidly growing East German building
markets, and followed the opening of a local marketing office in 1990. In 1993 and 1995,
Rockwool also acquired two factories in Poland. The East German production facilities
are managed from the West German affiliate, who took the leadership for the restructuring
and integration of the acquired firm.
The acquired firm had been established in 1985 to manufacture insulation materials
using western technology, but it was inhibited by unreliable supply and by product quality
problems. In 1989, the markets and networks of the GDR building industry broke down.
The firm initially survived by assigning some of its employees as a sales force in order to
establish contacts with the new building industry. However, they faced the uphill struggle
of a small, technologically inferior player in a market dominated by large Western
competitors.
After the take-over, Rockwool followed a strategy of technological transformation
through gradual investment. It was based on the introduction of latest technology and the
integration into the production structures of the West German Enterprise. The first step
was to rebuild the production with a single specialized production line based on company
specific technology. New lines were to be added later. The production was shut down for
three months to rebuilt the systems and to train all East German employees. Rockwool
reduced employment from 400 to 200. The remaining employees were educated in formal
courses held in West Germany and through continuous workplace instructions by West
9German colleagues.
This investment and training strategy reduced the capital investment required to about
US$ 15 million, compared to US$ 60 million for a new factory. It clarified the envisaged
strategic role of East German firm, and thereby gave its employee a vision, and defined
goals to pursue, soon after the take-over. Interview participants from both sides considered
the strategy of the initial transformation period to be fruitful, and feasible because of the
rather small size of the acquired firm. The employees appreciated the training but were
critical of general courses such as PC instructions that were often considered inadequate.
On the other hand, employees praised the practical workplace instructions as really useful
and interesting.
After the rapid transformation, the firm had one Western top manager in Flechtingen,
while marketing and sales were managed by West Germans, who initially were based in
a marketing office in Magdeburg. Thus, Westerners remained in charge of the external
relationships of the firm, whereas the internal organization, including the production as
well as personnel and accounting departments, was run by East Germans.
3.2. Danisco A/S: High-Technology in the Sugar Industry.
Danisco A/S is a Danish food-conglomerate with sugar, ingredients, food and beverage,
and packagings divisions. Danisco Sugar accounts for 37% of corporate turnover, and is
market leader in Denmark and Sweden. To broaden its area of operation, Danisco Sugar
entered Eastern Germany in 1991 to expand production possibilities and to enter the
German market.
The sugar industry is one of the most regulated industries in the European Union (EU).
With the German Unification, the EU regulation was extended to Eastern Germany giving
each of its 43 small sugar refineries a quota under EU rules. This quota turned out to be
the most attractive asset of the firms in the perspective of prospective foreign investors,
even though they are location-bound and thus require production in the region and
procurement from local sugar-beet farmers. Initially, the Treuhandanstalt sold the sugar
refineries to West German sugar refining companies. Following complaints to the EU
monopoly regulators, Danisco A/S could enter a bidding process for 8 sugar refineries in
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the Vorpommern area that were sold >en bloc=.
During central planning, the sugar industry was a neglected industry. Production
technology was, according to Danish managers, lagging 10 to 25 years behind West
European standards. This led to frequent production stops and severe problems in
maintaining product quality. According to the Danish management, their role was to
provide financial resources and implement technological modernization to overcome
bottlenecks in crucial resources.
The initial acquisition covered eight factories. Yet Danisco=s objective was to establish
one single large production facility which would be integrated into the production
structure of the parent firm. Transformation thus required to close down the old plants
while output at the new production facility rises. A peculiar constraint on the restructuring
was the need to maintain constant volume of output to retain the rights under the EU sugar
quota.
Employment has been reduced to 249 in 1994, from 1600 at the time of privatization
and 3000 before 1989. Thereafter employment increased to 269 in 1996. The future
workers were selected based on work experience and an age limit of 40 years.
Management explained the age limit with the considerable costs of staff training. All East
Germans had a background of specific education for the sugar industry. Although they
were used to other types of technology and, in the closed GDR context, had no access to
international know-how, they possessed essential core skills.
The Danish management chose a strategy of radical technological modernization thus
jumping stages of development that Western sugar refining went through during the past
decades. Danisco introduced formalized education programs to enable the move to central,
computer-based operations. The small group of production managers and skilled workers
selected for these jobs participated in two week-long courses in Denmark, introducing
them to computer technology and upgrading their knowledge of sugar processing
technology. It continued as training on the job with technical engineers available to
support employees at their work place.
Danisco retained East Germans in the key local executive positions, while technology
experts frequently visited the plant. Only two Danish expatriates were stationed
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permanently in East Germany, both as co-managers in a matrix structure, one beside the
local general manager and one beside the technical manager. During a transition period
of two years, the East Germans gradually took over as the executing actors. Both stated
that the scale of transformation in such short time would not have been possible without
the escorting management from outside.
In retrospect, a Danish manager evaluated this technological transition as undramatic.
It is however important to note, that the training of local employees focused on operative
functions. Projecting and programming engineering as well as marketing and sales are
managed in Copenhagen. Notable difficulties emerged for the integration of budget
management into the accounting system of the company. During central planning, the firm
had detailed book keeping but no budgeting. Therefore, a Danish co-manager was
accompanying the East German budget manager for years to supervise the financial
management.
3.3. Flexible Production in the Meat Industry
MEAT A/S is a meat processing firm which until recently was part of a major Danish
multinational corporation. Its strategic acquisition of a meat producer based near Berlin
aimed at penetrating the German market. In the acquisition contract with the
Treuhandanstalt, MEAT A/S committed to invest US $ 35 million in modernization of the
production, and to guarantee employment for 1250 persons for three years. The
subsequent restructuring was led by a team of Danish and West German managers who
occupied all top positions in sales, marketing, and financial management as well as middle
management positions in the personnel and logistics departments. On the board, only the
production manager was East German.
The East German firm used to slaughter and process meat on a very large scale. Its
production technology was of international standards as it had been established as prestige
project of East German engineering using imported machinery. Technologically, the
facilities were among the largest and best equipped in Europe. Nevertheless, the firm was
poorly prepared for the market economy. It focused on economies of scale and the
production of a standardized product, procuring meat from a single supplier and delivering
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output to Berlin and to the export ministry. With the break-up of both the supplier and the
customer relationships, this mode of production became uncompetitive.
However, its geographic location brought MEAT A/S close to the large and growing
market of unified Berlin. Here, existing and anticipated new supermarkets were the prime
target. However, the market was dominated by West German suppliers. Unexpectedly,
MEAT A/S faced a major image problem as an East German producer on West German
markets. Procurement also became a major obstacle when the sole previous supplier, a
nearby cattle combinat, was closed.
To be able to compete in new markets, deep restructuring of the production was
essential. New types of customers required customer specific products, individual
packaging, flexible adjustment with small batch sizes, and market-oriented product
development. The production process needed to become far more flexible and
differentiated and responsive to customer demand. This had major implications for factory
floor work organisation.
In the GDR, firms had large reserves of workforce and materials. The plant was
organized in specialized sub-units with their own closed structure based on functions and
responsibilities. The division of work had been taken to an extreme, and each worker had
a rather narrowly defined job description. This structure had to be broken up, i.e. workers
had to extend their perspective and their knowledge of connected areas and relations.
Every worker should extend his/her activity to - as the management put it - >fl xible work
arrangements=.
Shop floor team leaders and workers now had to organise themselves according to
broad objectives. The new work organisation required frequent changes of the type and
place of work. This was a radical break because in the old system a steady workplace was
a sign of respect to a skilled worker. Everyone worked hard at his specific function during
the periods of stress, while in between, they socialized. The interviewed shop floor
butchers expected that the >chaotic changes= would stop at some stage in the future once
market relations were established permitting a return to the previous stability.
In the new organization, costs, time, and quality control are essential. In the GDR, the
key economic variables were stated in volume, and thus the prime concern were the
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volume throughput and the procedures of cutting meat. Now, the organisation is expected
to maximize the value added of its meat products, a subtle but essential difference. Most
difficult to convey to the local workforce was the practice of >working up= meat, that is the
use of meat additives. Danish managers described this problem as East German workers
being unable to >see money=. The lack of adequate organizational solutions to the problems
of cost-awareness and detailed quality control led to the compensation of insecurity by
excessive use of expensive inputs. In the words of a Danish manager:
AIt is a danger for loosing really much money quickly if you are not in control of what is going on.
There is nothing easier for a >Meister=: If he wants to avoid quality problems, he simply makes the
sausage a little bit better than it should be, and that is expensive! That is very expensive. He must be
in control of that!@
The problems with respect to cost and quality control persisted even among the new
function leaders. The new work organisation delegates tasks of coordination, planning and
decision making, which requires ad hoc analysis, development of alternative solutions,
and taking responsibility for a decision.
Western managers described this as problems for the Easterners lacking comprehensive
and connected knowledge about the basic production rationality. Although the GDR firm
had detailed computer-based production planning, it had no adequate follow-up and fine-
tuning of the actual process. This resulted in problems concerning the >self-reflection= at
all levels of organisation  and of >i itiative to take action= if unexpected problems emerge.
The new organisation created entirely new role expectations for section managers and
workers.
4. Interpretation of the Cases
As we expected, the Danish partner made major contributions towards overcoming the
four gaps to strategic restructuring. In all three cases, the investor provided capital for
urgently needed investments, be it for upgrading of facilities or for building new plants.
They transferred extensive technological and managerial knowhow and established
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effective control over the formerly state-owned firm. The break-up of existing supply and
distribution networks was experienced in particular by MEAT A/S. The task of
establishing new market-based networks was interrelated with the development of new
procurement and marketing functions in the firm. Danisco and Rockwool, who are to a
larger extend competing in Europe-wide markets, overcame the problem by centralising
marketing operations in Denmark and West Germany respectively. Yet pouring in
resources and establishing new networks turned out to be only part of the task.
The cases show two different patterns of enterprise transformation which correspond
to patterns described in the literature for Eastern Germany and other countries of Eastern
Europe. Some post-socialist firms can - with some investment in facilities and skills - be
converted in a production line of a capitalist firm. Yet for many others, the transition is
not only from the central-plan economy to a market environment but to a modern multi-
product firm. This requires changes very deep inside the firm for two main reasons:
C The adaptation to a new economic system often has to be accomplished simultaneously
with the shift to post-Fordist production method, which requires entirely different
methods of organizing the business (Sorge 1993).
C Success in a market economy depends on tasks, skills and performance criteria that are
beyond the experience horizon of organizations used to the central-plan system.
Deficiencies in these areas can only be overcome through the acquisition of tacit know-
how which requires an inter-active and time-consuming learning process (Frydman and
Rapaczynski 1997, Swaan 1997).
Industrial production in the former Soviet bloc was based on the Fordist model of
production with high job specialisation and extensive use of economies of scale. Some
plants, e.g. those acquired by MEAT A/S and Rockwool, produced a standardized product
in facilities of high technological standards. From this base, Rockwool developed its new
East German affiliate as a specialised supplier while reducing employment. The
transformation had, compared to the other cases, a clearly defined goal, which required
primarily a classic upgrading and rationalisation within the Fordist model of production.
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The Danisco case is special due to the regulation of the industry. The restructuring of
the sugar plants was also a classic rationalization, but more ambitious in terms of the
advance of technological standards. The upgrading could be achieved with less direct
managerial involvement by Danish managers as it could utilize existing professional
knowledge and experience. Yet crucial aspects of transformation were bypassed as some
parts of management, notably budget-coordination and marketing, were centralized in the
Danish headquarters and were thus not part of the restructuring task.
This form of enterprise transformation within the Fordist model is typical for East
Germany, and has been criticised as building >extended production lines= of West German
Companies.6 It solves current problems of the firms, but offers few strategic long-term
perspectives. This is not only because of the resulting dependance on top management and
innovation in the Western parent firm, but because of the minor role of Fordist production
in Western Europe at the end of the 20th century. Its competitiveness is based on, in
Porter=s (1983) terms, >cost-leadership= which - with few exceptions - is not sustainable
in high wage countries. Therefore, growth industries in West Germany are focusing on
up-market segments. With its high labour costs, East German industry has to follow this
direction. Exceptions may exist in industries with high transportation cost such as staple
foods (e.g. sugar) or building materials (stone wool) and in capital intensive production.
Yet these industries are too small to generate the exports and employment that the region
needs.
                                         
6 See e.g. Heidenreich (1993), Geppert and Kachel (1995).
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Yet a >differentiation strategy= (Porter) requires not only a diversified product portfolio
but also flexibility and worldwide competitive quality. The failure to accomplish this shift
to >differentiated quality production= has, according to German sociologist Sorge (1993),
been a key failure of industrial transformation in East Germany. Sorge interprets the
observed rationalisation as emergent strategies, i.e. not as the result of strategic decisions
by management (or the Treuhandanstalt) but evolving from the persistence of habits of
leaders within the organisations.7 Local employees continue their routines, while Western
managers in the Treuhand and in the businesses apply concepts of management developed
elsewhere and insufficiently adapted to the local conditions.
These observations correspond to the basic tenants of evolutionary economics. While
changes in ownership and top management can be achieved within short time, changing
the ways an organisation functions is a process that is subject to substantial >inertia=.
Evolutionary economists consider knowledge of a firm as embodied in the routines it
develops  (Nelson 1995). Routines enable groups and individuals to follow their
objectives while overcoming limits of bounded rationality. However, once routines are
established, they are difficult to change. Inertial forces aim at securing continuity for
individuals and subunits within the organisation.8
However, the discrepancy between established routines and those needed under the
new regime is huge in the case of a change of economic systems. It is of different
                                         
7 Aderhold et al. (1994): use the concept of >Habi us= developed by French sociologist Bourdieu
(1982) to explain that the perception and reaction to current challenges is predisposed, but not determined,
by patterns of behaviour learned under the socialist regime.
8 Inertia in organisational change are also observed for organisations in Western economies
embarking on radical change (e.g. Anderson and Tushman 1990).
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magnitude than the technological progress analysed in the established management
literature (e.g. Adler and Shenhar 1990). Often, a completely different set of routines
needs to be developed. This leads to major inertia inhibiting enterprise transformation in
Eastern Europe (Michailova 1997).9
                                         
9  There is no contradiction between these inertia in organisational change and the observation
that some firms in Eastern Europe are introducing radically new forms of work organisation and
experiment with far greater flexibility than found in, say, Western Germany. If there are no institutions
that act as constraints, or individuals are confronted with very powerful incentives, such as poverty, they
do change their routines and even attitudes.
The case of MEAT A/S illustrates how inertial forces inhibit change even after a
foreign take-over. Despite the financial power and management know how of a
multinational company, it had great difficulties in implementing the deeper changes in the
acquired firm. Not only the corporate strategy needed redefinition, but the pattern of work
organization as well as individual behaviour and attitudes had to be modernized. Figure
3 illustrates the nature of these changes. Some of the challenges identified for operative
management emerged to a certain degree in all cases, but they became most apparent in
the case of MEAT A/S. We believe that this case illustrates challenges for post-acquisition
management across transition countries.
Figure 3: Challenges of operational transformation
Socialist firm Affiliate of a Multinational
Enterprise
Model of productionFordist post Fordist
Product range standard, large volume diversified, small batch sizes
Skills highly specialised towards generalists
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Work organisationcentralised decision processes,
narrowly defined job description
delegation of responsibilities,
broad tasks, flexible adjustment
to market forces
Business culture plan implementation based,
technological perfection of
quantitative target with given
means
cost-benefit based, continuous
improvement of the value of
production using new means
under economic considerations
Evolutionary
perspective
Stable routines, few innovationsNew basic routines, and frequent
innovations
To be competitive, MEAT A/S has to offer a variety of related products, each in smaller
batch sizes. This requires more frequent changes in the production process, and flexibility
in adjusting production to market conditions. The skills required are more generalist, in
contrast to highly specialist skills promoted in socialist firms. Employees need to be
retrained to master a variety of tasks and take over responsibilities as needs emerge.
5. Managing Deep Restructuring during Systemic Transformation
The level of education in the Soviet bloc was relatively high, especially in mathematics
and natural sciences.  Technical skills and basic research are generally above those of
countries with comparable levels of per capita income. Yet, as Swaan (1997a) showed,
complex organizational and technological skills, that would for instance enable persons
to apply their knowledge in a different context, are weak. These capabilities involve a high
degree of >tacit knowledge=. This is defined as >knowledge that individuals possess, but are
not able to explain= (Polanyi 1966).10 It is often team-embedded and requires complex
                                         
10 Teece (1977) showed the extend of costs associated with the transfer of tacit knowledge.
Kogut and Zander (1992) argue that the tacitness, and thus limited transferability, of knowledge is the
core to understanding the evolutionary process of firm growth. In the Eastern Europe transition literature,
Swaan (1997, 1997a) showed conceptually and empirically the need for tacit knowledge to accomplish the
system change.
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learning processes to be effective. Examples are knowledge on how to manage human
relations or how to make decisions under uncertainty.
Thus, the East-West knowledge gap concerns primarily skills that can only partially be
transferred through formal education or exchange of blueprints. Rather, it is knowledge
that needs to be transferred through active interaction between teacher and recipient, or
by >learning by doing=. This would explain why our interview partners found active
support on the work place and training in the Western parent company more useful than
formal training courses. The need to transfer tacit organizational knowledge creates
special challenges for managers as they have to communicate aspects of expected
individual behaviour that are taken for granted among employees who grew up in a market
economy.
Beyond acquisition of new skills, the way individuals interact and relate to their work
has to be changed.11 This affects all levels of the hierarchy from the shop floor to the top
management. New procedures for planning and control need to be implemented, a new
organizational structure, possibly a matrix structure, needs to be introduced, and a new
corporate strategy needs to be developed and internalized. Top management can be
changed through hiring a few key individuals from outside, as we have seen especially in
the MEAT A/S case.. However, organizational changes at lower levels have to integrate
the existing culture and the new corporate strategy.12
The change in culture is deeper than the adaptation of corporate culture following an
acquisition of a company that also is operating in an established market economy (cf.
Cartwright and Cooper 1993, Birkinshaw 1997). This is illustrated in figure 4. The
integration of corporate culture within the systemic change has specific features:
C Changes in the internal and external relationships of the firm are interdependent. The
                                         
11 Similar arguments have been made by Heidenreich (1993), Aderholt et al. (1994), Puffer
(1995) and Michailova (1997).
12 Aniszewska (1997) found in case studies in Poland that change of organisational culture did
not reach the shop-floor because of, among other, a lack of information, overly positive self-assessment
prior to privatisation and frustration over the lack of appreciation of the (technical) skills of the workforce.
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nature of new relationships depends on the progress that the firm, its partner, and the
environment make on the path of institutional transformation. As all the variables are
very instable, it requires frequent readjustment. This interdependence can both
accelerate or inhibit further progress if the speed of change differs among partners.
C The required change is deeper than a change within a market economy because the new
economic order is based on different attitudes, and even values, of economic agents.
Management focusing on strategic integration often appears to pay insufficient
attention to the human side of post-acquisition integration.
Under the old regime, plan fulfilment was the prime objective - irrespective of cost-benefit
considerations. The firm was organized around the central plan, and employees were
given incentives that encouraged fulfilment of plan targets. As the manager-quote (section
3) illustrates, employees in a market economy are expected to act in constant awareness
of the costs and benefits of their activities. In addition, corporate culture has to promote
continuous innovation and improvement. The central-planning regime established routines
which were stable, as dissent was discouraged and innovation was slow. A market
economy does not permit such stability. To stay ahead in a constantly changing industry,
firms have to generate innovations continuously - >m tations= in the evolution terminology
- which generate more productive routines.
The change of corporate culture thus affects not only what individuals do in the firm,
but how they do it, and how their activity is motivated, coordinated and assessed. In other
words, agents not only have to learn new skills, but they have to change their routines,
their attitudes and possibly their values.
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The challenge for management is to facilitate the simultaneous corporate and systemic
change. Our case observations suggest that the systemic aspect of enterprise restructuring
prolongs the time period of the post-acquisition integration processes (figure 4). This can
be explained by the deeper nature of change affecting groups an individuals. However,
this need not be so.13
The >plan-desertion= has led to an almost complete break-down of the patterns of
behaviour. Therefore, the willingness to accept something new is unusually high, as
observed notably in the Danisco case. Some forces in the environment, e.g. exposure to
Western marketing, are supporting changes of routines and attitudes. The ongoing process
of cultural evolution may in fact facili ate changes in work organization and skills. Post-
acquisition management thus may be able to accelerate the process by integrating changes
at societal level into its management training, and by directly addressing routines and
attitudes identified as inhibiting the new organization.
                                         
13 Evolutionary research does not provide a basis for prediction as far as the processes at
different levels of change may show co-evolution and simultaneity. They carry potentials for both
mutually supporting, conflicting or merging processes at different levels and stages of development.
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At the same time, strategic management has to acknowledge that it does not operate in
a history-free space. The new organization has to acknowledge local roots, or risk severe
internal frictions. For instance, shop-floor workers often possess job-specific skills which
provide a solid basis to acquire latest manufacturing know how. Lack of recognition of
these skills by the investors, has been a source of resentment by the local work force.14
To overcome the discrepancy between Eastern and Western organizations, new
solutions may be superior for the post-socialist environment than the superimposition of
routines that have been developed elsewhere. Therefore, the experimentation with new
ideas and organizational forms should be encouraged at early stages of this evolutionary
process (Kogut 1996). New approaches may reach an better synergy between the
experience of the multinational investor and the local firm. They may reduce not-
invented- here type frictions and make the change process more sustainable.
                                         
14 See Anizewska (1997) for a similar observation.
In this post-acquisition process, training and communication are essential. Training in
Eastern Europe should emphasize the transfer of tacit knowledge through on the job
training, practical demonstration by Western co-workers, and, if feasible, training on a
comparable job in the home country of parent firm. Such practical experience will raise
the cognitive horizon of employees and thus enable them to imitate successful pattern of
activity of their Western colleagues.
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Effective communication between the new leadership and local employees is needed
to convey the basic concepts of the aspired corporate culture (cf. Hasplagh and Jemison
1991). The case firms, incidences of insufficient interaction, misunderstandings over basic
concepts and language barriers inhibited communication between the new leadership and
the local workforce and thus the implementation of change in the case firms.15
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